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EFFORT AND PERFORMANCE IN PUBLIC-POLICY
CONTESTS
Abstract
Government intervention often gives rise to contests in which the possible
‘prizes’  are determined by the existing status-quo and some new  public-
policy proposal . In this paper we study the general class of such two-player
public-policy contests and examine the effect of a change in the proposed
policy, a change that may affect the payoffs of the two contestants, on their
effort and performance. We extend the existing comparative statics studies
that focus on the effect of changes either in the value of the prize in
symmetric contests or in  one of the contestants’ valuation of the prize in
asymmetric contests. Our results hinge on the relationship between the
strategic own-stake (“income”) effect and the strategic rival’s-stake
(“substitution”) effect. This relationship is determined by three types of ability
and stakes asymmetry between the contestants. In particular, we specify the
asymmetry condition under which a more restrained government intervention
that reduces the contestants’ prizes has the perverse effect of increasing
their aggregate lobbying efforts. 
Keywords: public-policy contests,  policy reforms, lobbying efforts, strategic
own-stake effect, strategic rival’s-stake (“substitution”) effect.













Tournaments, conflict, patent races and rent seeking have been modeled as contests in
which participants exert efforts to increase their probability of winning a prize. A
significant element in such contests is the function that provides each player’s
probability of winning for any given combination of the efforts made by the
contestants, the so called contest success function (CSF). In the literature specific
CSF’s have been employed without any particular reason other than analytical
convenience. Skaperdas (1996) provided a rationale for employing a particular CSF
by axiomatizing the general class of additive CSF’s. A large class of contests has thus
been rationalized. In most studies of contests, however, the source of the prize or,
more generally, the source of the contestants’ prize valuations has been ignored.
Despite the fact that in some studies the source of the prize system has been based on
the existence of monopoly profits (rents) or various forms of  protective trade-
policies, Mueller (2002), the general role of public policy as a determinant of the
contest prize system was not adequately studied.  The main objective of this paper is
to fill this gap.
           Our argument is that quite often the prize system is determined  by government
intervention that takes the form of a policy proposal that constitutes an alternative to
an existing status-quo policy.  The possible ‘prizes’ or stakes of the affected interest
groups are equal to the differences in the payoffs corresponding to the status-quo and
the proposed policy reform.  Whether the proposed policy is implemented or not
depends on the outcome of a political contest in which these groups exert efforts to
increase the probability that their preferred policy, the existing policy or the proposed
policy, is the outcome of the contest.  The existing status-quo policy is the realized
contest outcome if the proposed policy is rejected.  The alternative proposed policy is
the implemented contest outcome if the proposed policy is approved. Typically,
therefore, in a two-player contest one interest group supports the rejection of the
proposed policy because it prefers the status-quo policy while the other interest group
supports the approval of the alternative proposed policy.  For example, a tax reform
may be supported by one industry and opposed by another. Existing pollution
standards may be defended by the industry and challenged by an environmentalist
interest group.  A monopoly can face the opposition of a customers coalition fighting2
for appropriate regulation.
1 Capital owners and a workers union can be engaged in a
contest that determines the minimum wage, and so on
2. The outcome of such contests
depends on the contestants’ exerted efforts (fighting, lobbying or rent-seeking efforts),
that depend, in turn, on the parameters of the contest and, in particular, on the
contestants’ payoffs in the event that the public-policy proposal is approved or
rejected.  Some of the above examples are elaborated in the sequel to illustrate the
effect of a policy reform on the payoff structure of the contestants.
         A major concern in the contest literature has been the issue of how do changes
in the parameters of the contest (number, valuations and abilities of the contestants
and the nature of the information they have) affect their equilibrium efforts and the
extent of relative prize dissipation,  Hillman and Riley (1989), Hurley and Shogren
(1998), Nitzan (1994). In addition, attention has been paid to the effect of changes in
these parameters on the contestants’ expected payoffs, Baik (1994), Gradstein(1995)
and Nti (1997, 1999) and on their aggregate expected payoff, Epstein and Nitzan
(2001b). The main comparative statics concern of  this study is  the clarification of the
effect of changes in public policy that determine the prize system on the contestants’
efforts and performance: probability of winning the contest. Earlier studies examined
the sensitivity of total efforts to changes either in the value of the prize or in the prize
valuation of one of the contestants. Our extended comparative statics analysis  focuses
on the effects of a change in the proposed public policy that generates simultaneous
modifications in the prize valuations of all the contestants. Nevertheless, even in those
cases that such a change only modifies the prize valuation of a single contestant, we
generalize the existing results that dealt with special forms of our general contest
success function.   
                                                
1 A special case of this setting is studied by Baik (1999)  who analyzes the welfare effect of consumer
opposition to the existence of monopoly rents.
2 Two recent examples from U.S politics that illustrate the public-policy contest that we study are the
congressional reviews of late-term Clinton administration actions on ergonomics and environmental
regulations on land use in national forests. Both regulations were reviewed and criticized by the new
Congress, and both could have been squelched. But the ergonomics regulations (a decade in the
making) were overturned under the Congressional Review Act of 1996, while the environmental
regulations were allowed to stand. The explanations for these outcomes can be traced to the strength of
the interest groups supporting the regulations (organized labor and the environmental lobby,3
          We first present the general framework of binary public-policy contests with
two possible states of nature (approval and rejection of the proposed policy) allowing
the general contest success functions axiomatized by Skaperdas (1996). This
framework has numerous possible applications such as contests on the approval or
rejection of a proposed minimum wage, monopoly regulation, tax reform, protection
by tariff or some new environmental policy. The rest of the paper is then devoted to
the comparative-statics properties of the public policy contest and, in particular, to the
clarification of the role of three types of asymmetry between the contestants on the
sensitivity of effort and performance to the proposed public policy. 
          Changes in the asymmetry between the contestants can give rise to perverse
incentives for a politician who designs a contest. Baye et. al. (1993) have shown that a
politician wishing to maximize political rents may find it in his interest to exclude
certain lobbyists from participation in the lobbying process - particularly lobbyists
valuing most the prize - because this increases the lobbying efforts of the remaining
contestants. More recently, Che and Gale (1998) have proved that asymmetric limits
on exerted effort can also have the effect of increasing the total efforts of the
contestants. We show that in a public-policy contest, under certain conditions of
asymmetry between the contestants, a more restrained government intervention that
reduces the prizes of the two contestants has the perverse effect of increasing their
total exerted efforts.
          In section II we introduce the public-policy contest.  In section III we present
the function that generates the prize system (the stakes) of the contest and illustrate its
applicability.  Section IV contains the comparative statics analysis that focuses on the
effect of changes in the proposed public policy on the equilibrium asymmetries
between the contestants and, in turn, on the equilibrium effort of the interest groups
and on their probability of winning the contest.  Section V contains brief concluding
remarks. 
II. The Public Policy Contest
In our contest the players are two interest groups that are differently affected by the
approval and rejection of a proposed policy.  In general, one group derives a higher
benefit than the other from the realization of its preferred policy.  We therefore refer
                                                                                                                                           
respectively).4
to one player as the Low-Benefit (LB) player and to the other player as the High-
Benefit (HB) player
3. The interest groups engage in a contest that determines the
probabilities of approval and rejection of the proposed policy.
4 
         P l a y e r  i’s preferred policy is approved in probability Pr i. The present
discounted value of this policy to this player is equal to ui  and its value to his
opponent player j is equal to vj. By assumption then, for each player, approval of his
preferred policy is associated with a positive payoff, that is, ui > vi . Note that, in
general, the four values uL, vL, uH and vH, viz., the players’ payoffs corresponding to
the approval and rejection of the policy I proposed by the government (a ruling
politician or a bureaucrat) depend on I. 
 Let  xi denote the effort of the risk-neutral player i. The expected net payoff of
i is given by:
(1) ( ) () () j i   ,    Pr Pr ≠ − + = i j j i i i x I v I u w E
           Given the contestants’ efforts, the probabilities of approval and rejection of the
proposed policy, PrL and PrH , are obtained by the contest success function. As in
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3 See Epstein and Nitzan (2001a).
4 Modeling the contestants as single agents presumes that they have already solved the collective action
problem.  The model thus applies to already formed interest groups. 
5 The function Pri( j i x x , ) is usually referred to as a contest success function (CSF). The functional
forms of the CSF’s  commonly assumed in the literature, see Nitzan (1994) and Skaperdas (1996),
satisfy these assumptions. 5
The ability of a contestant j to convert effort into probability of winning the contest
can be represented by the marginal effect of a change in his effort on his winning
probability. By assumption, this marginal effect is declining with his own effort. A
change in his effort also affects, however, the marginal winning probability of his
opponent i. The opponent i has an advantage in terms of ability if a change in j’s
effort positively affects his marginal winning probability.  In other words, a positive
(negative) sign of the cross second-order partial derivative of  Pr i() , j i x x , 
i j
i




implies that i has an advantage (disadvantage) when j’s effort changes.   At some
given combination of efforts  ), , ( j i x x  the ratio between the effect of a change in j’s
effort on the marginal winning probability of i and the effect of a change in j’s effort




















, is therefore a local measure of the asymmetry
between the abilities of i and j.  This asymmetry together with two types of stakes-
asymmetry that are presented below play a crucial rule in determining the
comparative statics effects on which this study focuses.  
          Denote by  ni = (ui -vi) the stake of  player i (his real benefit from winning the
contest), (see Baik, 1999, Epstein and Nitzan, 2001b and  Nti, 1999). A player’s stake
is secured when he wins the contest, that is, when his preferred policy is the outcome
of the contest.  Recall that for one player the desirable outcome is associated with the
approval of the proposed policy while for the other player the desirable outcome is
realized when the proposed policy is rejected.  The expected net payoff (surplus) of
interest group i can be rewritten as follows:
 
(3)           ( ) () () i i i i i x I n I v w E − + = Pr    
          In general, the stakes of the contestants are different, that is, one of them has an
advantage over the other in terms of his benefit from winning the contest. With no
loss of generality, we assume that nL  ≤ nH .   The ratio  H L n n  is a measure of the
asymmetry between the stakes of the contestants.6
By our assumptions, both players participate in the contest (xL and xH are
positive).  We therefore focus on interior Nash equilibria of the contest. Solving the





















 we obtain:              
(4)           ( )






i , , 0 1
, Pr
= ≠ ∀ = −
∂
∂
= ∆    










    
By the expressions in (5) that determine the equilibrium efforts of the players and
their probabilities of winning the contest and by the assumed properties of the CSF,
we directly obtain that under a symmetric contest success function
7
() , ( Pr ) , ( Pr   , , i j j j i i j i x x x x x x = ∀ ), the player with the higher stake makes a larger
effort and has a higher probability of winning the contest. The probability of the
socially more efficient outcome of the contest is thus higher than the probability of the
less efficient outcome. For a similar result see Baik (1994) and Nti (1999).  This type
of efficiency criterion has been used by Ellingsen (1991), Fabella  (1995) and, more
recently, by Hurley (1998).
III. Public Policy and the Prize System (The Contestants’ Stakes)
A change in the policy instrument I has an effect on the stakes of the players and thus
on their efforts and on their probability of winning the contest
8. In this section we
examine how a change in the proposed policy affects the prize system, that is, the
                                                
6 It can be easily  verified that the second order conditions  hold.
7 Such symmetry implies that the two players share an equal ability to convert effort into probability of
winning the contest.
8  Note that the domain of the policy instrument I , the closed interval II I ∈[,]   , may reflect
economic feasibility or political feasibility. 7
contestants’ stakes, assuming that the functions ni(I) ( i = L, H) are continuous and
twice differentiable in I.  A policy reform may affect the stake of one of the
contestants or the stakes of both of them. Denoting the effect of a change in I on  i n  by







= ' , our subsequent analysis relates to all of the following five possible
types of public-policy effects on the stakes of the interest groups: 
                     Table 1:The Possible Types of a Policy Reform 
                Type                      i n'                    j n'
                  (i)                    >0                   <0
                 (ii)                    >0                   =0
                (iii)                    =0                   <0
                (iv)                    >0                    >0
                 (v)                    <0                    <0
In reforms of type (ii) and (iii), a change in I only affects the stake of one interest
group. The incidence of the proposed policy reform in these cases is therefore partial.
A change in I can be interpreted as a more (less) restrained government intervention if
it reduces (increases) the affected stake. Clearly, such a change also affects the stakes-
asymmetry between the contestants. For example, in type (ii) reform where i=H, an
increase in I represents a less restrained intervention that increases the asymmetry
between the stakes of the contestants.
In the remaining types the incidence of the proposed reform is complete because
a change in I affects the stakes of the two contestants.  In reforms of type (i) a change
in the policy instrument I  has opposite effects on the stakes of the two players. If
i=H, such a change positively affects  the asymmetry between the stakes of the
contestants. If  i=L,  the asymmetry between the stakes is inversely related to a
change in I. In both cases a change in the proposed policy can be considered as a more
restrained government intervention if it reduces the sum of the stakes  H L n n +  .
In reforms of type (iv) and (v) a change in I  has a similar positive or negative
effect on the stakes of the players. In both of these cases, therefore, such  a change can8
be unambiguously interpreted as a more restrained or a less restrained government
intervention. In these cases the effect of a change in I on the stakes-asymmetry
depends on the relationship between the elasticities of the stakes with respect to I.















η= , j = L, H. In a type (iv) reform the asymmetry





<1. In a type (v) reform the





>1.   
          Usually, a change in public policy affects the stakes of the two contestants. The
applicability of the corresponding reforms of type (i), (iv) and (v) is illustrated by the
following examples.
Monopoly price regulation: Several authors have pointed out that consumers oppose
government protection of a monopoly in attempting to defend their surplus, Baik
(1999), Ellingsen (1991), Fabella (1995). The government is assumed to make a
binary decision: regulating the monopoly or not, that is, force the firm to charge the
competitive price or let it charge the profit-maximizing monopoly price.  In this
example therefore the firm is the LB player and the consumers’ representative is the
HB  player.  A change in the proposed price positively affects the stakes of both
players, provided that the monopoly price ranges between the competitive price and
the profit-maximizing monopoly price.  Under this example the reform is of type (iv).
If the monopoly price is restricted to the range of prices exceeding the profit-
maximizing monopoly price, then a change in price inversely affects the firm’s stake
and positively affects the consumers’ stake.  In such a case the example of monopoly
price regulation is a type (i) reform where i=H.  
Public-Good Provision: The government considers building a park on the border of a
residential neighborhood.  In order to finance the project, a general tax is levied on all
residents of the country who may benefit from the provision of the proposed park.  In
addition to the tax, the local residents, the individuals who reside close to the park, are
subjected to another “tax”: the negative externalities (increased congestion, noise,
etc.) associated with living close to a public park that attracts a large number of9
visitors all year round.  Suppose that the policy instrument of the government is the
tax paid by the residents of the country.  We consider three possible cases:
  (1)  The collected taxes are allocated to the building of the park.  An increase in
the lump-sum tax or in the tax rate implies an increase in the size of the park.
We assume that such an increase raises the benefit of the non-local residents,
however, it reduces the benefit of the local residents.  In contrast to example 1,
in the present example it is not clear who is the LB and the HB player.  It is
clear nevertheless that as the size of the park increases, the benefit of the non-
local residents from approval of the proposed tax and from the corresponding
park and the benefit of the local residents from the rejection of this proposal
increase with the tax and, in turn, with the size of the park.  As in the previous
example the proposed reform is of type (iv) .
  (2)  Although an increase in taxes increases the park size, we now assume that
beyond a certain point, an increase in the size of the park does not increase the
benefit of the general public.  In such a case, an increase in taxes and, in turn,
in the size of the park may reduce the benefit associated with the approval of
the proposed change in the tax for the non-local residents, while increasing the
net benefit associated with the rejection of the proposed tax change for the
local residents.  In such a case, the proposed reform is of type (i) or type (ii).
  (3)  Suppose that the collected taxes are used to finance the park as well as to
compensate the local residents for the negative externalities.  In such a case it
is possible that an increase in the proposed tax results in a decrease in the
benefit associated with the rejection of the proposed tax change for the local
residents while reducing the benefit associated with the approval of the
proposed tax change for the non-local residents. The reform can be of type (v). 
Protection by Tariff: The study of trade policy determination has often applied rent
seeking or contest models, Hillman (1989), Mueller (2002). Consider, for example, a
local producer who wishes to be protected by a tariff on the import of the product he
produces. Such a protection creates rents for the producer, however, it reduces the
welfare of the consumers.  This simple example is similar to the first example of
monopoly price regulation.  The producer is the LB player and the representative of
the consumers is the HB player.  An increase in the proposed tariff increases the
benefit of the consumers from disapproval of the proposed tariff change.  It also10
increases the benefit of the producer from the approval of the proposed change in the
degree of protection he enjoys. The proposed reform is of type (iv) and, subject to the
required modifications in the interpretation of the LB and HB players, the conclusions
obtained in this example are similar to those of the first example.
 9
          Clearly, numerous other applications come to mind.  In fact, any setting where
public policy affects the payoffs of two agents (interest groups), such that one agent is
interested in the approval of the proposed policy and the other agent supports the
rejection of that proposal can serve as an illustration to our model. One can easily
construct other examples assuming, for example, that the policy instrument is the
quality of a public good provided by the government, the degree of privatization of a
particular publicly-owned company or any control variable that results in income
transfer from one agent (interest group) to another.
IV. Public Policy, Efforts and Winning Probabilities
The effort exerted in the public-policy contest deserves attention because it can be
interpreted as social costs and, therefore, serve as a measure of inefficiency.
Understanding how public policy affects this effort, which is often referred to as rent
dissipation, is the main goal of the proposed theory of public-policy contests. 
          By differentiation of the first order conditions (see (4)), we get that the Nash
equilibrium efforts satisfy the following conditions:
(6) H L j i j i
x x x x








































We thus obtain that:
                                                
9 If the policy instrument is a protective general tariff - which is imposed on all imported products including the
imported inputs, the representatives of the local producers and the consumers are, respectively, the LB and HB
players.  In such a case, rejection of a proposed increase in the tariff increases the net benefit of the local
producers.  Approval of such a proposed increase in the protective tariff may increase or decrease the benefit (the
rent) of the local producers.  The latter possibility occurs when production costs become sufficiently high due to
the increased tariff on the imported inputs.  Under this latter possibility, the proposed reform is of type (i).
Otherwise we are back to a type (iv) reform.11
(7) H L j i j i
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Rewriting (7) together with (5), we obtain the fundamental equation that generates all
the comparative statics results:
(8) H L j i j i n
x B
n
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 and all second-order partial
derivatives are computed at the Nash equilibrium ( ) * , * L H x x . The first term in (8)
represents the strategic rival’s-stake (“substitution”) effect. The sign of this term is








. The second term represents the own-stake (“income”)













 and, by  (2),   () ()
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 .  Hence, B>0.
A. . Public Policy, Efforts and Winning Probabilities
When a change in I only affects the stake of one of the contestants, as in reforms type
(ii) and (iii),     i η  or  j η  is equal to zero and (8) reduces to
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In these cases the change in player i’s effort corresponding to the change in  j n  is
equal to the strategic rival’s-stake (“substitution”) effect, when i≠ j, or to the strategic12
own-stake (“income”) effect, when i=j.  The former effect is ambiguous, depending
on the sign of the cross-partial derivative of the contest success function. The latter
effect is clear-cut, due to our assumption that the marginal winning probability of a
contestant is declining in his own effort.  
In case (ii) with i=H and case (iii) with i=L,  
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In cases (iii) with i=H and case (ii) with i=L, 
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We therefore obtain
Proposition 1:  
In case (ii) with i=H and case (iii) with i=L, 





















In cases (iii) with i=H and case (ii) with i=L, 





















Proposition 1 directly yields the following general comparative statics result that
focuses on the sensitivity of a contestant’s effort to a change in his or his rival’s stake:
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By this first corollary, under our general contest success function, the effort exerted
by a contestant is positively related to his stake. That is, the strategic own-stake
(“income”) effect is always positive (effort of every player is a “normal good”). In
contrast, the effort exerted by a player can be positively or negatively related to the
stake of his rival. It can also be independent of the rival’s stake. When the marginal13
winning probability of a contestant in equilibrium is positively (negatively) related to
his rival’s effort, his strategic substitution effect is positive (negative). Following
Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemprer (1985), in such a case we say that a contestant’s
effort is a strategic complement (substitute) to his rival’s effort.  When the cross-
partial derivative of the contest success function is equal to zero the contestants’
efforts are independent. Note that, by (2), in our setting the strategic substitution
effects are asymmetric; if a player’s effort is a strategic complement to his opponent’s
effort, then his opponent’s effort is a strategic substitute to his effort.
          In the symmetric case where, ,  x and   L H x ∀ ) , ( Pr 1 ) , ( Pr L H H H L H x x x x − = , there
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x x ∂ ∂
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< 0 . Hence,
by Corollary 1.1,
Corollary  1.2:  If,   ,  x and   L H x ∀  ) , ( Pr 1 ) , ( Pr L H H H L H x x x x − = ,  then 




































This second corollary generalizes the result obtained by Nti (1999) where Pr i is
assumed to take the particular symmetric logit form, as in Tullock (1980),









, I = L, H.  In this special case of symmetric lobbying abilities
of the contestants, the HB player can be referred to as the favored player and the LB
player can be referred to as the underdog, see Dixit (1987). Corollary 1.2 establishes
that effort of the favored player increases with both his own stake (valuation of the
contested prize) and with the stake (prize) valuation) of the underdog. Effort of the
underdog increases with his stake (prize valuation), but decreases with the stake (prize
valuation) of the favored player. 
          Another more general asymmetric form of the logit contest success function is:











, where  , 0 > σ  h(0) 0 ≥  and h(x i) is increasing in  i x
10, see
                                                
10 In this special case we keep the assumption that a contestant’s marginal winning probability is14
Baik (1994). Here the parameter σ  represents the asymmetry between the lobbying
abilities of the two players. Note that when σ <1 the HB player   has an ability
disadvantage relative to the LB player. It can be shown that  under this particular
contest success function, Sign (
H L
L
x x ∂ ∂
∂ Pr
2
) = Sign ( H L Pr Pr − ) and, therefore, for some
σ * < 1,  H L Pr Pr = =1/2  and  
H L
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 = 0 . By  Corollary 1.1 we get
Corollary 1.3: If 











, where  , 0 > σ  h(0) 0 ≥  and h(x i) is
increasing in x i , then 




































This third corollary generalizes Proposition 1 in Baik (1994). 
B. Complete incidence: Policy reforms affecting both stakes
When a change in I affects the stakes of the two contestants, as in reforms type (i),
(iv) and (v),   L η  and  H η  are positive or negative. By the fundamental equation (8),
when the contestants’ efforts are independent, the sensitivity of every contestant’s
effort with respect to a proposed policy reform is always unequivocal. When the
contestants’ efforts are not independent, the sensitivity of one of the contestants’
effort with respect to a proposed policy reform is always unequivocal because the sign
of his strategic rival’s-stake (“substitution”) effect is equal to the sign of his strategic
own-stake (“income”) effect. The sensitivity of his opponent’s effort with respect to
the proposed policy reform is ambiguous, depending on whether his strategic own-
stake (“income”) effect is larger than, equal to or smaller than his strategic rival’s-
stake (“substitution”) effect. Using (8) we thus get
                                                                                                                                           
declining in his effort . This requires additional assumptions on the first and second derivatives of the
function h( ) i x .15
Proposition 2: In cases (i), (iv) and (v),
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By Proposition 2 (a), if the contestants are symmetric in equilibrium in terms of their
abilities , then the strategic rival’-stake (“substitution”) effects vanish (efforts are
independent) and the positive strategic own-stake (“income”) effect solely determines
the direct effect of a change in I on a contestant’s effort. In the perfectly symmetric
case where,  ,  x and   L H x ∀  ) , ( Pr 1 ) , ( Pr L H H H L H x x x x − =  and  n n n L H = = , there
exists a symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium, x L H x* * = , and 
H L
L
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= 0 , see Dixit (1987). Hence, by Proposition 2 (a),
Corollary 2.1: If, ,  x and   L H x ∀ ) , ( Pr 1 ) , ( Pr L H H H L H x x x x − =  and   n n n L H = = , then 













This corollary generalizes a similar result established by Nti (1999), assuming a
particular contest success function of the logit form.
          Proposition 2(b) can be used to determine the sensitivity of the contestants’
efforts in all possible situations corresponding to the three types of policy reforms









.  Consider for example a type (i) policy reform









,  that is, the effort of the HB player is a strategic
substitute of the effort of the LB player.  By Proposition 2 (b), in such a case,  16

































           Notice that by Proposition 2(b), the conditions resolving the ambiguity
regarding the sensitivity of j’s effort to a proposed policy reform involve the three




































3 . In fact, the comparison between
the strategic rival’s-stake (“substitution”) effect and the strategic own-stake
(“income”) effect depends on the relationship between the ability-asymmetry
represented by  j A





























































To illustrate the economic interpretation of this corollary, suppose, for example, that
the  HB  player has a disadvantage in terms of his equilibrium ability (marginal









.  By Proposition 2, when the proposed
reform is of type (iv), an increase in I induces the LB player to increase his effort. In
this case the HB player’s effort is a strategic substitute to the LB player’s effort, so the
strategic substitution effect induces the HB player to reduce his effort.  However, his
effort is a “normal” good, so the increase in his stake induces him to increase his
effort. The latter effect is dominant and the HB player also increases his effort, if his
















 is larger than his ability disadvantage, which is represented by the17






















interpretations can be given to the conditions in Corollary 2.2 in all other possible
situations corresponding to the three types of reforms affecting the two players, given
that the HB player is advantageous or disadvantageous in terms of his equilibrium
ability.
  In our setting, the response of one contestant to a change in the proposed
policy is ambiguous. A change in I may differently affect therefore the aggregate
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proposed reform the effect of a change in I on the aggregate effort  L H x x X * * * + =  is
















, by  (8’) and Corollary 1.1 we get:
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That is, if i’s effort is a strategic complement to j’s effort, then aggregate effort
increases with an increase in j’s stake. Aggregate effort also increases with i’s stake, if
the positive strategic own-stake (“income”) effect of player i is larger than the
negative strategic rival’s-stake (“substitution”) effect of player j.
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This proposition states the condition that resolves the ambiguity regarding  the
sensitivity of aggregate effort with respect to a change in I . The condition clarifies the
role of stakes-asymmetry and ability-asymmetry between the contestants. It implies,
in particular, that even under the most restrained type-(v) policy reform that reduces
the stakes of the two contestants, it is possible that  the two contestants are induced to
increase their aggregate effort. This occurs when the negative rival’s-stake
(“substitution”) effect of the contestant  who is induced to increase his effort more
than counterbalances the  sum of the two positive own-stake (“income”) effects and
his opponent’s positive substitution effect. Alternatively, if the LB player’s effort is a
substitute to the HB player’s effort, a sufficiently high  reduction in the normalized







, would induce the LB player
to increase his effort such that aggregate effort is increased. When the HB player’s
effort is a substitute to the LB player’s effort, a sufficiently small  reduction in the








the HB player  to increase his effort such that aggregate effort is increased. The fact
that a reduction  in stakes-asymmetry can give rise to perverse effort incentives have
been noticed by Baye et. al. (1993) and by Che and Gale (1998). The former scholars
have noticed that a politician who designs a contest  may find it in his interest to
exclude  certain lobbyists from participation in the lobbying process - particularly
lobbyists valuing most the prize - because this increases the lobbying efforts of the
remaining contestants. The latter scholars have noticed that asymmetric limits on
exerted effort can also have the effect of increasing the aggregate efforts of the
contestants. We show that in a public-policy contest, under a sufficiently high or a
sufficiently low reduction in stakes-asymmetry, the most restrained government
intervention that takes the form of a type-(v) policy reform that reduces the prizes of
the two contestants may have the perverse effect of increasing their  aggregate efforts.
          Let us finally consider how a change in the proposed policy affects the
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may rewrite (10) as:
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By this proposition we get: 
Corollary 5.1:






























© Under a type-(iv) reform,  















































(d) Under a type-(v) reform,















































Under a type (i) reform with i=H,  an increase in the proposed policy increases  the
stakes-asymmetry between  the contestants . In other words, such a reform tends to
increase the disadvantage of the LB player in terms of stakes. If he is also
disadvantageous in terms of ability (marginal contest winning probability), then, by
Corollary 5.1 (a), the proposed increase in I reduces both his effort (see Proposition 2)
and his probability of winning the contest. Notice that this is the case, despite the
possible decline in the effort exerted by the HB player. Under a type-(i) reform with
i=L, an increase in the proposed policy reduces the stakes-asymmetry between  the
contestants . That is, the LB player becomes less disadvantageous in terms of the
contest stakes. If he also has a disadvantage in terms of ability (marginal contest
winning probability), then, by Corollary 5.1 (b), the proposed increase in I increases
his probability of winning the contest, despite the fact that his effort need not rise (see
Proposition 2).
V. Conclusion 
          Government intervention often gives rise to contests in which the possible
prizes are determined by the existing status-quo and some new public-policy proposal.
Since a proposed policy reform has different implications for different interest groups,
these groups make efforts to affect in their favor the probability of approval of the
proposed public policy. A change in the proposed policy modifies the stakes of the
interest groups who take part in the contest on the approval or rejection of the
proposed policy. Such a change has two effects on the nature of the public-policy
contest. On the one hand, it affects the degree of competition by increasing or
decreasing the sum of the potential prizes (stakes). On the other hand, it also affects
the contest degree of competition by increasing or decreasing the asymmetry between
the contestants’ stakes (prize valuations). What determines the contestants’ effort
response to the proposed policy reform and, in turn, the change in their probability of
winning the contest, are three asymmetry factors: The existing stakes-asymmetry; the
asymmetry in the effect of a proposed reform on the existing stakes; and the ability-
asymmetry: the asymmetry in the effect of a change in a contestant’s effort on his
own and on his opponent’s marginal probability of winning the contest.   
           We studied a general class of two-player public-policy contests and examined
the effect of a change in the proposed policy, a change that may affect the payoff of
one contestant or the payoffs of the two contestants, on their effort and performance. 21
Proposition 1 and its corollaries generalize the comparative statics results of Baik
(1994) and  Nti (1999) that focus on the effect of  changes either in the value of a
contest prize in symmetric contests or in  one of the contestants’ valuation of the prize
in asymmetric contests, assuming special forms of our general contest success
function. Propositions 2 – 5 present the comparative statics results in the extended
setting where the proposed public policy determines the prize system: the stakes of
the two interest groups. All the results hinge on a fundamental equation that stresses
the significance of the relationship between the strategic own-stake (“income”) effects
and the strategic rival’s-stake (“substitution”) effects corresponding to any change in
the proposed public policy. We clarified how this relationship is determined by the
three types of asymmetry between the contestants. In particular, we specified the
asymmetry conditions under which a more restrained government intervention that
reduces the contestants’ prizes has the perverse effect of increasing their aggregate
lobbying efforts. This result complements the related findings of Baye et. al (1993)
and Che and Gale (1998) that were established in the context of all-pay auctions.
While these scholars focused, respectively, on constraints on the set of contestants and
on caps on lobbying expenditures as possible means of reducing the asymmetry
between the contestants, we emphasize the role of public policy reforms in generating
direct changes in stakes-asymmetry and indirect changes in ability-asymmetry
between the contestants. 
            The public-policy contest that we studied has numerous applications.  It seems
to us that it can constitute a useful basic building block in a more general theory of
endogenous public- policy determination. In such a theory the contestants themselves
could determine the two competing policies. Alternatively, another player, naturally
the government, could design the contest and control the prize system by determining
the proposed policy reform. Such a designer might be solely concerned with the
aggregate efforts of the contestants (the lobbying expenditures or the campaign
contributions), as in Baye et. al. (1993). But, of course, he  may have broad objectives
that take into account the aggregate efforts of the contestants as well as their welfare
(expected payoffs), as in Epstein and Nitzan (2001a), Grossman and Helpman (1994)
and Hillman (1982).         
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